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Abstract
Tourists, hikers, mountaineers, locals and volcanologists frequently visit
and reside on and around active volcanoes, where ballistic projectiles are a
lethal hazard. The projectiles of lava or solid rock, ranging from a few
centimetres to several metres in diameter, are erupted with high kinetic,
and sometimes thermal, energy. Impacts from projectiles are amongst the
most frequent causes of fatal volcanic incidents and the cause of hundreds
of thousands of dollars of damage to buildings, infrastructure and property
worldwide. Despite this, the assessment of risk and communication of
ballistic hazard has received surprisingly little study. Here, we review the
research to date on ballistic distributions, impacts, hazard and risk
assessments and maps, and methods of communicating and managing
ballistic risk including how these change with a changing risk environ-
ment. The review suggests future improvements to the communication and
management of ballistic hazard.
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1 Introduction
Ballistic projectiles are one potentially lethal and
damaging hazard produced in volcanic eruptions.
Ballistics are fragments of lava (bombs) or rock
(blocks) ejected in explosive eruptions
(Fig. 1a, b). Projectiles range from a few cen-
timetres to tens of metres in diameter and sepa-
rate from the eruptive column to follow nearly
parabolic trajectories (Wilson 1972; Fagents and
Wilson 1993; Bower and Woods 1996). Their
exit velocities can reach hundreds of metres per
second and land up to *10 km from the vent,
although typically within ﬁve kilometres (Blong
1984; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012).
Ballistics are associated with all forms of
explosive eruptions but are considered major
hazards of hydrothermal, phreatic, phreatomag-
matic, Strombolian and Vulcanian eruptions,
especially those which have little to no precur-
sory signals of volcanic unrest. Managing bal-
listic hazard and risk on active volcanoes,
particularly those permanently occupied or reg-
ularly visited, presents considerable challenges: it
requires good information and specialist com-
munication strategies around risk mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery dependent
on the state of the volcano, e.g. pre-, during- and
post-eruption. In this chapter, we present an
overview of volcanic ballistic hazards and
impacts and the communication strategies used
to manage risk on active volcanoes.
2 Ballistic Hazard and Risk
Management
Ballistic projectiles are a risk to life on active
volcanoes and can cause substantial damage to
exposed infrastructure and the environment due
to their high kinetic energy, mass, and often high
temperatures (Blong 1984). Volcanic ballistic
projectiles are amongst the most frequent causes
of fatal incidents on volcanoes, with at least 76
recorded deaths at six volcanoes (Galeras, Yasur,
Popocatepetl, Pacaya, Raoul Island and Ontake)
since 1993 (Baxter and Gresham 1997; Cole
et al. 2006; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012;
Wardman et al. 2012; Tsunematsu et al. 2016).
Many more people have been injured as a result
of ballistic impacts, frequently suffering from
blunt force trauma (broken bones), lacerations,
burns, abrasions and bruising (Blong 1984;
Baxter and Gresham 1997). Additionally, dam-
age to buildings (Fig. 1c, e), infrastructure,
property and the surrounding environment
(Fig. 1d) are also common occurrences from
ballistics during explosive eruptions. The high
kinetic and thermal energy of ballistics can
puncture, dent, melt, burn and knock down
structures and their associated systems, such as
power supply and telecommunication masts;
crater roads; and crush and potentially ignite
crops (Booth 1979; Calvari et al. 2006; Pistolesi
et al. 2008; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012;
Wardman et al. 2012; Maeno et al. 2013;
Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Jenkins et al. 2014). Blong
(1981), Pomonis et al. (1999) and Jenkins et al.
(2014) estimate a ballistic only needs 400–1000 J
of kinetic energy to penetrate a metal sheet roof,
far less than the estimated kinetic energy of
ballistics (*106 J) from VEI 2-4 eruptions
(Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012).
The distribution (distance from vent, direc-
tion, area and density) of ejected ballistics is
controlled by the explosivity, type, size and
direction of explosive eruptions, and usually
creates spatially variable deposits (Gurioli et al.
2013; Breard et al. 2014; Fitzgerald et al. 2014).
Generally, the distance travelled and the total
area impacted by ballistics increases with
increasing explosivity, i.e. particles generally
travel further and cover a greater area in Vulca-
nian eruptions (Nairn and Self 1978;
Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012; Maeno et al.
2013) compared with Strombolian eruptions
(Harris et al. 2012; Gurioli et al. 2013; Turtle
et al. 2016). However, eruptions can be directed,
ejecting ballistics at low angles and at distances
greater than those from more vertically directed
eruptions (Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Tsunematsu
et al. 2016). The directionality of these blasts is
often unpredictable, and can be influenced by
external factors such as landslides (Christiansen
1980; Breard et al. 2014), making it difﬁcult to
deterministically forecast future ballistic
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distributions. Mapped deposits from past erup-
tions are often not symmetrical around the vent,
reflecting this directionality (Minakami 1942;
Fudali and Melson 1972; Steinberg and Lorenz
1983; Kilgour et al. 2010; Houghton et al. 2011;
Gurioli et al. 2013; Fitzgerald et al. 2014), and
are sometimes the result of the crater and sur-
rounding topography (Breard et al. 2014;
Tsunematsu et al. 2016). Detailed descriptions
and maps of ballistic impact distributions are
rare, but those published may contain some of
the following data: maximum ballistic travel
distances (Steinberg and Lorenz 1983; Robertson
et al. 1998; Kaneko et al. 2016); the outer edges
of a ballistic ﬁeld (Minakami 1942; Nairn and
Self 1978; Yamagishi and Feebrey 1994); and/or
maximum particle (Nairn and Self 1978; Stein-
berg and Lorenz 1983; Robertson et al. 1998;
Swanson et al. 2012) or crater size (Robertson
et al. 1998; Maeno et al. 2013; Kaneko et al.
2016). When isopleths of particle size are
included these rarely contain individual mea-
surements and may be severely limited by the
availability of only speciﬁc mapped locations
(e.g., Kilgour et al. 2010; Houghton et al. 2011).
For this reason, the number of particles, sizes of
particles, and spatial density per unit area is
rarely reported (only four publications could be
found with this level of detail—Pistolesi et al.
2008; Swanson et al. 2012; Gurioli et al. 2013;
Kaneko et al. 2016). This leads to a limited
understanding of the hazard and risk posed to the
area.
Though work has been completed on ballistic
hazard (e.g., mapping deposits, better under-
standing eruption dynamics and the factors that
Fig. 1 Types of ballistic particles and their impacts:
a Ballistic bombs from Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu (Photo
credit Ben Kennedy), b Ballistic blocks (1.4 m diameter
block) from the August 2012 Upper Te Maari eruption,
c Damage to a building from ballistics ejected in the 2000
Mt. Usu, Japan eruption, d Damage to the environment
illustrated by a 4.4 m wide crater from the August 2012
Upper Te Maari, Tongariro eruption, e Damage to a hiking
hut from 2012Upper TeMaari ballistics (Photo creditNick
Kennedy)
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influence ballistic distribution, recording particle
velocities, the creation and use of ballistic tra-
jectory models, and the production of hazard
maps either focussed solely on ballistics or as an
aspect of a multi-hazard map), very little has
been focussed on the management of ballistic
risk, leaving a large knowledge gap and a need
for research in this area. Risk management
strategies and mitigation systems are key to
protecting life and infrastructure from ballistic
hazards (Leonard et al. 2008; Bertolaso et al.
2009; Bird et al. 2010; Jolly et al. 2014b).
Table 1 lists some of the strategies and tools used
at volcanoes around the world.
Effective communication of ballistic hazard
and risk to end-users such as the public, stake-
holders in the area and emergency managers
underpins effective development and implemen-
tation of these risk management strategies.
However, ballistic hazard and risk are not and
should not be treated the same at all volcanoes.
The risk environment (the hazard, the number of
people and assets exposed and their associated
vulnerability) will determine the strategies, tools
and methods of communication, and their rela-
tive importance, utilised in the overall risk
management strategy. The volcano tourism
industry is also growing (Sigurdsson and
Lopes-Gautier 1999; Erfurt-Cooper 2011),
increasing the number of people exposed to
ballistic hazard in proximal areas. In addition,
population growth in many volcanic regions
means increasing numbers of people are settling
closer to and on volcanoes (Small and Naumann
2001; Ewart and Harpel 2004). This creates an
increasing demand for ballistic hazard and risk
assessments coupled with effective communica-
tion strategies to manage ballistic risk at volca-
noes. Ballistics are not a hazard in isolation.
Their management needs to be integrated with
that of other volcanic hazards (especially pyro-
clastic density currents in terms of near-vent life
safety, but also landslides, lahars, lava flows, and
volcanic gas emissions/areas of hot ground), and
other life safety issues such as severe weather
and mountain safety.
3 Assessments of Ballistic Hazard
and Risk
Successful management of the risk from ballistic
hazards typically requires ﬁrst assessing the level
of risk. This may range from the simple recog-
nition that ballistics may endanger people or their
activities on a volcano through to a sophisticated
quantitative hazard or risk assessment (e.g.
Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012; Jolly et al.
2014b). Ballistic hazard assessments determine
the likelihood of ballistic-producing eruptions
and the areas that may be impacted (Thouret
et al. 2000; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012).
Risk assessments estimate the likelihood of
consequences (i.e. death, injury, damage) from
exposure to ballistics, typically with an associ-
ated probability of occurrence (Blong 1996).
Once the level of risk has been assessed it can be
used as the robust basis for risk management
strategies, such as exclusion zones, hazard/risk
maps and signs, and land-use planning. Ideal
assessments involve a number of steps including:
(1) a review of the eruption history of the vol-
cano to determine past eruption frequencies and
magnitudes, thus informing future eruption
probabilities; (2) ﬁeld mapping, remote sensing
and/or review of past reports and literature to
determine the nature and extent of past ballistic
distributions; (3) utilising ballistic trajectory
models to explore possible future distributions
and areas of hazard; (4) identifying exposed
assets in the area such as humans (visitors and
inhabitants) and infrastructure; and (5) estimating
their vulnerability to the hazard i.e. likelihood of
fatality or damage (Nadim 2013). Assessments
are ideally probabilistic, providing spatially
varying probabilities of occurrence and damage
from a range of scenarios varying in frequency
and magnitude, and accounting for model and
input parameter uncertainty. They should be
constantly reﬁned and improved as new infor-
mation becomes available.
A hazard map is a primary tool used to present
hazard and risk information (Sparks et al. 2013).
Zonation is generally used as a means to
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distinguish areas of hazard, exposure, vulnera-
bility and risk (Sparks et al. 2013). Ballistic
hazard map zones may be classiﬁed by maximum
travel distance of particles (either any size or a
speciﬁc sized particle; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia
et al. 2012), number of ballistic impacts per unit
area (Gurioli et al. 2013), probability of a speciﬁc
size of ballistics reaching a given area (Artund-
uaga and Jimenez 1997), or probability of a
speciﬁc consequence occurring e.g. death, injury,
damage (Fitzgerald et al. 2014). A good example
of a ballistic hazard map that follows the
best-practice steps above was created by
Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. (2012) of
Popocatepetl Volcano, Mexico. In this example,
eruption history and frequency of occurrence are
used to deﬁne three eruption scenarios (High:
VEI 2–3 (as they are more frequent), Intermedi-
ate: 4, and Low: 5 (though an eruption of this
size would affect more people and impact a larger
area, it has a much lower likelihood of occur-
ring). The maximum travel distance of ballistic
projectiles from each scenario (based on ﬁeld and
model distributions) is then used to deﬁne the
extent of the hazard zones. Additionally, the map
identiﬁes nearby towns and roads exposed to
ballistic hazard.
In many instances, it may not be possible or
warranted to complete all of the steps involved in
an ideal risk assessment. For example, Gareloi
Volcano, Alaska is located on an uninhabited
island, thus a detailed ballistic hazard assessment
was not the priority of initial hazard assessments.
Coombs et al. (2008) explore the eruptive history
of Gareloi Volcano, though eruption frequency is
only narrowed down to one eruption every
20–50 years and is not broken down into erup-
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one hazard zone (a 5 km concentric radius
around the vent), whose extent is based on
Blong’s (1996) assessment that ballistics gener-
ally do not travel further than 5 km from vent. It
is also mentioned that recent ballistic distribu-
tions have not travelled further than several
hundred metres from vent. Neither a determin-
istic or probabilistic approach was taken, instead
a value was adopted from other eruptions around
the world.
Very few studies exist on ballistic risk or
vulnerability. We summarise the three that could
be found. Booth (1979) presents an example of a
volcanic risk map for the La Primavera Volcanic
Complex, Mexico. Though ballistics are inclu-
ded, they are not ascribed a probability of
occurrence, instead, one zone at risk of ballistic
fall is deﬁned by the maximum travel distance
for ballistics up to 0.1 m in diameter. The
equation that Booth used to calculate risk
includes probability of occurrence, indicating
that eruption frequency has been examined;
however, neither the probability used nor the
description of prior eruptive history are provided
in the publication. Thus, though an end-product
of a risk map is produced, the process itself is not
documented. Pomonis et al. (1999) utilise the
Blong (1981) impact energy thresholds for roof
perforation to assess building vulnerability from
an eruption of Furnas Volcano, the Azores. Two
risk zones are assigned (moderate and high)
based on the statement that ballistics generally
land within 5 km of the vent, but sometimes up
to 10 km. The study only considers one eruption
(the last major eruption), thus is lacking eruption
frequency and magnitude, and does not provide
any probabilities of building damage occurring.
Building vulnerability to ballistic impact has
been assessed by Jenkins et al. (2014) for Kan-
laon and Fogo volcanoes (Philippines and Cape
Verde, respectively) using estimates of energy
required to penetrate roof materials by Blong
(1981) and Pomonis et al. (1999). This study,
however, focussed only on the vulnerability of
the built environment and did not include an
overall assessment of hazard or risk. Eruption
frequency and magnitude, the extent of past
ballistic distributions, and modelling of possible
future trajectories were not investigated.
Assessments may also vary depending on the
state of the volcano. Volcanoes in a state of
quiescence allow for (and call for) more in-depth,
preferably probabilistic, assessment to be com-
pleted, ideally following the steps outlined ear-
lier. However, quiescent volcanoes may not be
the primary target for in-depth assessment.
Conversely, renewed volcanic activity, especially
when unexpected, urgently demands rapid hazard
assessments which may, as a result, be too sim-
plistic, overly conservative or lacking sufﬁcient
detail to be considered complete. They also need
to be focussed on the range of scenarios pre-
senting the risk in that crisis (e.g. from one vent),
rather than the entire background risk from that
volcano (e.g. from multiple vents). Leonard et al.
(2014) describe the process of creating a crisis
hazard map for the 2012 Upper Te Maari erup-
tion, comparing this to the existing background
hazard map. In the case of a volcano in a state of
unrest, assessments may be limited by the
availability of safe locations to survey, and this is
especially likely once an eruption episode has
commenced as evident during the 2012 Upper Te
Maari, Tongariro eruptions and assessments
presented later. Odbert et al. (2015) have been
developing updateable hazard forecast estimates
using Bayesian belief networks, which may help
to improve rapid hazard assessments in times of
crisis.
4 Communication and Risk
Management Strategies
Effective communication is essential in manag-
ing ballistic hazard and risk (Barclay et al. 2008;
Leonard et al. 2014). Science needs to be com-
municated to decision-makers, stakeholders, and
the public and understood and absorbed by them
so they can make informed decisions. Similarly,
the public, stakeholders, and decision-makers
should communicate to scientists what type of
information they need to make decisions relevant
to their situations. Ballistic communication
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methods used at volcanoes include hazard and
risk assessments, hazard maps, volcano moni-
toring and research, real-time warning systems,
volcanic alert levels; volcano warnings, alert
bulletins and communication with agencies;
response exercises, education materials, response
plans, exclusion and evacuation zones, instruc-
tions and signage for what to do in the event of
an eruption around the volcano, community
engagement, educational materials, and land-use
planning and infrastructure design. These meth-
ods typically fall under four aspects of emer-
gency management: Mitigation (Reduction),
Preparedness, Response and Recovery (UNISDR
2009). Methods must also be integrated with the
management of other risks, ideally in one cohe-
sive approach. Ballistic communication strategies
will also vary with eruption frequency, the risk
context (quiescence or crisis; Fig. 2), whether
volcanoes are frequently visited or inhabited, and
the availability of resources. This equally applies
to volcanoes at which ballistics are/are not the
main hazard.
Effective risk management is built on com-
munication, hazard education and engagement
with the at-risk communities (Johnston et al.
1999, 2000; Paton et al. 2001; Twigg 2002;
Gregg et al. 2004; Leonard et al. 2008; Dohaney
et al. 2015). Appropriate risk management
actions by stakeholders, emergency managers
and the public require an adequate perception of
the risk and the correct actions to take in a crisis,
with perception dependent on the hazard infor-
mation received and exposure to impacts (John-
ston et al. 1999; Leonard et al. 2014). Knowledge
and understanding of volcanic hazards allows
individuals to better decide whether to undertake
preparedness and response measures, and if so,
Fig. 2 Various ballistic hazard and risk communication
processes (blue) and products (red) implemented over the
changing state of the volcano and the stage of risk or
emergency management. The level of activity/importance
is indicated by line style, with solid lines indicating higher
use or importance
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which are required, thus reducing their vulnera-
bility to the hazard(s) (Siegrist and Cvetkovich
2000; Paton et al. 2008; Bird et al. 2010).
Scientiﬁc information can be misunderstood,
misrepresented or distorted when passed from
scientists to end-users (stakeholders, emergency
managers and the public; Barclay et al. 2008).
This can occur when end-users do not compre-
hend or are unaware of the science being pre-
sented, the information is not what is actually
needed by end-users, the science is communi-
cated poorly to end-users, or there is a lack of
trust between groups (Haynes et al. 2007). All
groups therefore need to communicate with each
other, preferably prior to a volcanic crisis, with
communication products tailored to the audience
(Haynes et al. 2007; Leonard et al. 2008). Fol-
lowing the 1979 eruption of Mt. Ontake, Japan
the National Research Institute for Earth Science
and Disaster Prevention in Japan (NIED, though
now renamed to National Research Institute for
Earth Science and Disaster Resilience) com-
pleted a report recommending: regulations on
development and land-use, building of ballistic
shelters and evacuation facilities, and the devel-
opment of emergency plans, as an eruption in the
summer hiking season would likely result in
human casualties (NIED 1980). However, the
report may not have been suitable or communi-
cated well to the local municipalities responsible
for disaster management as these recommenda-
tions were not adopted prior to the 2014 eruption,
indicating the need for communication to ensure
the information is relevant, understood and acted
upon (Barclay et al. 2008; The Japan News,
27/10/2014). Communication delivered jointly
by scientists and the local community is also
advisable as community members may be better
trusted and better communicators to their com-
munity than scientists in isolation. Users must be
able to trust the source of the information being
released as well as how and what is presented
(Slovic 2000; Haynes et al. 2008). It is also
therefore important for scientists and emergency
managers to be honest about what is/is not
known to maintain credibility and trust (Lindell
2013).
Best practice suggests the use of multiple
sources to disseminate hazard and risk informa-
tion as preferred forms of media accessed for
information vary (Sorensen 2000; Mileti et al.
2004; Haynes et al. 2007; Bird et al. 2010). The
public’s response to volcanic hazard communi-
cation is influenced by the content and attrac-
tiveness of the message (which should include a
description of the hazard, its impacts, hazard
extent, and advice on what to do and when), how
comprehensible it is, and the frequency and
number of channels the message is received
from, as well as the extent of public belief that
safety actions are possible and will be effective
(Leonard et al. 2008; Sorensen 2013).
4.1 Ballistic Communication
Processes and Products
in Different Risk Contexts
4.1.1 Volcano Quiescence
Communication and risk management methods
vary with changing eruptive states. In times of
quiescence focus is placed on risk mitigation and
preparedness, with access generally allowed into
the hazard zone. In terms of ballistics this
includes the completion of ballistic hazard and
risk assessments; volcano monitoring and
research; land-use and building planning i.e. the
building of ballistic shelters capable of with-
standing ballistic impacts or the reinforcement of
existing structures to speciﬁc building standards,
and the choice of location for hiking trails,
viewing platforms or other visitor facilities; the
creation of well distributed hazard maps with
instructional text with what to do or where to go
in an event of an eruption; and engagement with
the local communities including exercises and
evaluation (Fig. 2).
Hazard and risk assessments are useful start-
ing points for all communication and manage-
ment strategies as the nature, extent and
consequences of the hazard need to be under-
stood prior to any decisions being made. The
assessment should be made available to relevant
decision makers, with the authors and science
The Communication and Risk Management of Volcanic Ballistic Hazards 9
advisors available to advise or answer questions
about the assessments. Scientists/authors should
always strive to be transparent in their method-
ology. Transparency builds trust and credibility.
It is important that stakeholders know the limi-
tations of the information presented to them
and/or informing decisions which affect them. It
may not be needed or appropriate for the meth-
ods to be presented to the stakeholders in depth
but instead it be communicated that they are
available if requested. However, it is imperative
to think of the risk context when making these
decisions, as every situation is different. Methods
and assessments should also be made fully
available to other scientists so that these methods
can be adopted at other volcanoes if chosen,
which would increase best-practice and encour-
age similar and comparable methodologies.
These assessments also need to be communicated
to the public so that they can make informed
decisions about the hazard and risk in the area
they choose to enter as well as what steps they
need to take to protect themselves.
The main way assessments are communicated
is through a map (Haynes et al. 2007). Ballistic
hazard maps are rare as they are typically not the
only hazard produced in an eruption. Instead
ballistics are typically included in ‘all-hazard’ or
‘multi-hazard’ maps (Fig. 3) depicting the gen-
eral hazard for all active vent(s) (Neal et al. 2001;
Hadisantono et al. 2002; Mount Fuji Disaster
Prevention Council 2004; Kagoshima City 2010;
Leonard et al. 2014). Ballistics are usually rep-
resented by one hazard zone, often based on the
maximum or expected travel distance of a bal-
listic clast. This is, in part, because the public
require concise, easily comprehensible informa-
tion, rather than being distracted or overloaded
with speciﬁcs of individual hazards (Haynes
et al. 2007; Leonard et al. 2014). An effective
hazard map for the public contains clear infor-
mation on what are the consequences of the
hazard(s), where they occur, and what to do
(Leonard et al. 2014). For ballistics, impacts may
be death or injury; impact locations are usually
within 5 km of the vent; and advice may include
“if ballistics are landing around you, move out of
their oncoming path, seek shelter and make
yourself a small target.” Advice on actions to be
taken may vary at different volcanoes, although it
would be beneﬁcial if messages are consistent
across all volcanoes to reinforce actions and
increase the likelihood of people following the
correct actions. For this to occur, testing of
suggested actions would be required to ensure
that the safest and most successful measures are
being advised. For example, where frequent
Strombolian eruptions are the main source of
ballistics, it may be possible to watch the low
velocity ballistics and move out of their path.
However, in many other eruption styles multiple
particles may be ejected rapidly toward a person,
presenting a situation in which dodging one
ballistic may put you in the path of another. It
may be more beneﬁcial to make yourself as small
a target as possible, seek shelter and use your
backpack as a protective shield. Additionally,
ballistics may be accompanied by a surge as seen
in the 2014 Mt. Ontake (Kaneko et al. 2016;
Oikawa et al. 2016) and August 2012 Te Maari
eruptions (Breard et al. 2014), inhibiting the
ability to see ballistics until it is too late to act.
Map design should also take into account the
effect of map properties on communication
(understanding/comprehension) such as data
classiﬁcation, basemap or image, colour
scheme (e.g. for colour blind readers), content,
and key expression (Haynes et al. 2007;
Thompson et al. 2015). Haynes et al. (2007)
evaluated the effectiveness of volcanic hazard
maps as communication tools on Montserrat,
West Indies and found that the use of aerial
photographs as a basemap improved people’s
ability to comprehend hazard information com-
pared to traditional contour basemaps. In general,
it has been found the public do not comprehend
maps well and professional design input guided
by iterative evaluation of map comprehension is
wise (Haynes et al. 2007; Thompson et al. 2015).
In contrast to the public, more specialist stake-
holders such as infrastructure managers may
require more detailed and hazard speciﬁc infor-
mation about the impacts, location and recom-
mended actions to inform decisions on land-use
and building strength e.g. ballistics impacts in
zone 1 can be expected to have sufﬁcient energy
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to cause severe damage to nearly all types of
infrastructure below a certain design standard.
Multiple zones of different impact intensity may
be shown (e.g. travel distance, density of impacts
in an area, size and or energy of expected bal-
listics in given scenarios). All end-user maps
should successfully balance adequate detail and
maximum clarity. Hazard maps and additional
information should be made available and
accessible to the public, and if different maps are
made for, or directed to, different audiences their
content must be consistent. Public availability
may include being posted on signs around the
volcanoes entrance(s), in a pamphlet or similar
printed media at tourist facilities (e.g. informa-
tion centres, tourism businesses, hotels, back-
packers accommodation, transport operators),
and on relevant websites such as volcano
observatories and those charged with managing
natural hazards.
Additionally, community engagement and
participation in meetings with scientists and
managers is encouraged as a means of risk
communication, and discussion around manage-
ment strategies, especially for communities at
risk (i.e. tourism providers and those living near
or on the volcano) (Cronin et al. 2004; Williams
and Keys 2013). Ballistic hazards lend them-
selves to this type of community engagement
because many open system volcanoes that may
be constantly erupting but not considered to be in
a state of volcanic crisis (e.g. Stromboli, and
Yasur) have frequent ballistic-producing erup-
tions that provide an attraction to tourists and
employment for the local community. Ballistics
at these constantly erupting volcanoes provide
Fig. 3 Volcanic hazard maps of Tongariro volcano, New
Zealand: a General background hazard map used in
quiescent periods (GNS Science 2007), focussed on
hazards from events up to a scale that may not have
signiﬁcant precursors to enable warning; b Event-speciﬁc
crisis hazard map following the 2012 eruptions of Upper
Te Maari (GNS Science 2012). Note that map A is shown
as an inset on map B with an explanation as to the
complementary but differing nature of the two commu-
nication products
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tangible hazards that the community can both
relate to and provide valuable observational data
on. Meetings should be sufﬁciently regular to
update residents when the status of a volcano is
changing and to remind them when necessary of
the hazards and risks. Brieﬁng those new to the
area, especially the transient visitor, may be the
biggest challenge. Engagement allows the com-
munity to be prepared in the event of an eruption
and to know what to do in the event that they are
within hazard areas.
4.1.2 Volcanic Crisis
In a volcanic crisis (when the volcano is showing
signs of unrest or is in eruption) communication
and emergency management processes and
products move toward response (Fig. 2).
Real-time warning systems triggered by moni-
toring equipment, such as the EDS (Eruption
Detection System) system installed on Mt. Rua-
pehu, New Zealand (Leonard et al. 2008), are
used to communicate an eruption to those in the
immediate vicinity. Wider communication occurs
when an event is communicated from monitoring
equipment to scientists, then onto emergency
managers and decision-makers. Part of this pro-
cess is the release of alert bulletins/warnings to
advise the public of unrest, eruption phenomena,
affected areas, and should always include
instructions on what to do. Alert bulletins,
existing hazard maps and risk and hazard
assessments provide emergency managers with
information to make decisions on limiting access
to parts of the volcano. In the case of ballistics,
limits or restrictions on access or development
are usually achieved via creation of an exclusion
zone, typically 1–4 km in radius (Kagoshima
City 2010; Jolly et al. 2014b), or by reducing
exposure by limiting the time spent or number of
individuals allowed within a zone (Bertolaso
et al. 2009).
During the crisis, hazard maps are typically
updated and hazard and risk assessments modi-
ﬁed. Maps are generally event-speciﬁc and only
used over a short time-frame, reverting back to
the original background hazard maps once the
crisis period is over (Leonard et al. 2014; Fig. 3).
However, ballistic hazard mapping during a
crisis can be limited by access restrictions due to
the possibility of further eruptions, though as
time progresses more detailed mapping is able to
be completed (Fitzgerald et al. 2014). The
ongoing work by Odbert et al. (2015) in devel-
oping a real-time updateable probabilistic risk
assessment may prove useful in these situations.
The event-speciﬁc hazard maps are generally
shared around the various media outlets (e.g.,
television, radio, newspapers, Facebook, Twitter)
to inform the public of the updated hazard, as
well as through the usual means of communica-
tion. They may be augmented by speciﬁc life
safety signage (e.g. Fig. 4).
Meetings and consultations with local com-
munities, emergency managers and other stake-
holders should also occur during and following
volcanic crises. The objectives of such meetings
are to update communities on the evolving
eruptive hazards, build relationships and trust,
reduce any miscommunication or misinformation
Fig. 4 Crisis communication sign temporarily used at
Ruapehu volcano following a small eruption in 2007,
while it was considered there was an elevated risk of
further eruptions
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passed along, and to make sure the information
being presented is what the end-members need
(Barclay et al. 2008; Bertolaso et al. 2009).
Communication of ballistic hazards and risk
management vary at frequently erupting volca-
noes that commonly enter in and out of crisis,
such as Sakurajima in Japan. Access is generally
controlled at all times (even during periods of
quiescence), sometimes with permanent restric-
tion zones in which nobody is allowed to enter
due to the risk of being struck by ballistics
(Kagoshima City 2010). In these cases different
hazard scenarios may be pre-prepared and com-
munication strategies reused with a population
that is well educated about the volcano.
4.2 On-Going Challenges in Ballistic
Risk Communication
Many volcanoes are tourist destinations with
associated tourist facilities such as ski ﬁelds,
accommodation and walking tracks
(Erfurt-Cooper 2011). One challenge of com-
municating ballistic risk is to transient popula-
tions, especially tourists and other visitors.
Tourists spend only a short amount of time in
areas (hours to weeks) and often have little
knowledge of the hazards or the available pro-
tection resources (Murphy and Bayley 1989;
Drabek 1995; Burby and Wagner 1996; Bird
et al. 2010). They often rely on tourism
operators/employees/guides to inform them of
volcanic hazards and the correct actions to take
in an eruption (Leonard et al. 2008; Bird et al.
2010). This is evident at Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu
where guides are frequently relied on to com-
municate ballistic hazard and safe areas to
approach around the volcano, and at Tongariro
Volcano, New Zealand where transport operators
can give important information to 85% of all
those hiking the Tongariro Alpine Crossing
(TAC). However, tourism staff may also be
somewhat transient, meaning that they may need
to be regularly educated, trained or updated on
volcanic hazards, appropriate responses and
emergency procedures so that they can pass the
message down to their patrons (Leonard et al.
2008; Bird et al. 2010; Williams and Keys 2013).
Additionally, education material such as pam-
phlets and hazard maps on volcanic hazards
should not only be available at tourism busi-
nesses but mechanisms should be in place that
ensure that the hazard information is relayed to
these transient populations.
Another ongoing challenge in communicating
ballistic hazard is the lack of warning time asso-
ciated with events that have little precursory
activity, in which ballistics are typically one of
the main hazards. In this scenario volcanic alert
levels and bulletins may not be released prior to
eruption. Instead, visitors and stakeholders would
have to rely on their knowledge of the potential
hazards and the response actions to take, espe-
cially if there are no real-time warning systems.
This places more emphasis and weight on the
availability of background hazard maps with
messaging covering actions in events up to this
size, signage around the volcano (in language(s)
appropriate for the audience to comprehend,
especially if there is a large proportion of visitors
who speak a different language), on pamphlets
distributed to businesses and visitors actually
reading them, and through communication with
their guides. Many visitors to the TAC still
assume that they do not need to be concerned
because they expect the area to be closed if it is
unsafe or to be advised it was unsafe (Keys 2015).
We present the various ballistic risk manage-
ment and communication approaches taken at
four volcanoes: Upper Te Maari, Tongariro Vol-
canic Complex, New Zealand; Yasur Volcano,
Vanuatu; Sakurajima Volcano, Japan and Mt.
Ontake, Japan (Table 2). These volcanoes have
been chosen for their variation in: frequency of
eruption (Sakurajima and Yasur frequently erupt,
while Upper Te Maari and Mt. Ontake have
longer repose periods), available resources (Yasur
has less monitoring equipment and hazard infor-
mation available than the other three examples),
eruptive styles—Yasur predominantly erupts
bombs from small Strombolian eruptions; com-
pared with phreatic eruptions from Mt. Ontake
and Upper Te Maari and Vulcanian eruptions
from Sakurajima that erupt blocks over a larger
area, and the similarity in eruptions but with very
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different consequences between Upper Te Maari
and Mt. Ontake. Additionally, all of these vol-
canoes are relatively accessible and attract large
numbers of tourists each year.
5 Case Studies
5.1 2012 Eruptions of Upper Te
Maari, Tongariro, New
Zealand
On the 6th August 2012, Upper Te Maari Crater,
one of the many vents on Tongariro volcano,
New Zealand, erupted for the ﬁrst time in over
100 years (Scott and Potter 2014). The
hydrothermal eruption produced multiple pyro-
clastic surges, an *8 km high ash plume and
ejected thousands of ballistic blocks (Fitzgerald
et al. 2014; Lube et al. 2014; Pardo et al. 2014).
Blocks were distributed over a 6 km2 area,
affecting *2.6 km of the popular Tongariro
Alpine Crossing (TAC), a walking track fre-
quented by around 100,000 people a year
(Fitzgerald et al. 2014). Additionally, Ketetahi
Hut, an overnight hut along the TAC, was
severely damaged by ballistics. Fortunately, the
eruption occurred at night, in winter (the low
season) and in bad weather, resulting in no hikers
along the TAC or staying at Ketetahi Hut (both
around 1.5 km away from the vent and well
within the impacted area). A smaller eruption
Table 2 Comparison of the four case studies and their risk management and communication strategies
Upper Te Maari Yasur Sakurajima Mt. Ontake
Dominant eruptive style Hydrothermal Strombolian Vulcanian Phreatic
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followed on 21 November 2012, though ballis-
tics and pyroclastic surges were conﬁned to
within a well posted risk management zone 1 km
from the vent and did not affect the TAC.
Ballistics were a known hazard from the active
vents of Tongariro, witnessed in the 1974–5
Ngauruhoe eruptions (Nairn and Self 1978). As
such they were described on the background
hazard map for the volcano (Fig. 3a). The map,
published in 2007, consists of a summit hazard
zone around each active vent, encompassing gas
and ballistics at radii of 2–3 km for different vents
based on experience of ballistic ranges in past
eruptions at Tongariro National Park. Work is
underway to develop ballistic and life safety
models to better inform zone radius. Pyroclastic
density currents (PDC’s) and lava flows are not
included in a hazard zone but are mentioned as a
possibility in all valleys. Ashfall is stated as a
hazard that could occur any place on the
map. Text is provided, with instructions including
to move quickly down off the mountain and away
from summit hazard areas, though
ballistics-speciﬁc advice was not provided (GNS
Science 2007). The background hazard map with
associated instructions was permanently posted at
the entrances to the walking tracks up the vol-
cano, was available on the GNS and DOC web-
sites as well as on flyers at many of the tourist
hubs (Leonard et al. 2008, 2014). The TAC hik-
ing track cuts through most of the summit hazard
zones, where access has been open at background
levels. One hut, Ketetahi Hut, is located within
the summit hazard zone, though is not reinforced
to protect against ballistic impact.
Unrest was observed at the volcano up to three
weeks before the eruption, initially in the form of
increased seismicity and then increased magmatic
gas content (Jolly et al. 2014a). In response the
Volcanic Alert Level was raised from 0 to 1
(indicating unrest). Seismicity declined in the
days prior to eruption and thus the TAC remained
open to tourists (Jolly et al. 2014b), with seis-
micity reoccurring only*5 min before the event
(Jolly et al. 2014a). In the build-up to the erup-
tion, a decision was made to complete response
plans and create a crisis hazard map initially for
the whole volcanic massif with some focus on the
northern flank of Tongariro. However, it was not
publically available before the August 6th erup-
tion (Leonard et al. 2014). GNS volcanic alert
bulletins were also produced, communicating
updates on the precursory phenomena observed at
Tongariro (Volcanic Alert Bulletins
TON-2012/01–04; Fig. 5e). Meetings and other
discussions were held with the local residents and
businesses involved with the TAC to discuss the
situation and future scenarios. Being wintertime,
there was very little use of the track. As there was
no one on the hiking trail during the eruption it is
difﬁcult to assess the success of the hazard com-
munication strategies, and these strategies would
have been different during summer months with
heavy track use.
Following the August event, some of the local
population evacuated for the night and the TAC
was closed for two months due to the risk of
further eruption. Within this two-month period
an updated hazard and risk assessment was
completed (Jolly et al. 2014b). This involved a
combination of reviewing the eruptive record to
understand eruption frequency and magnitude,
and expert elicitation by GNS staff (the institute
responsible for monitoring volcanoes and
assessing their hazard/risk) working closely with
the land manager (Department of Conservation)
to produce three possible future eruption sce-
narios (a 21 November size eruption, a 6 August
size eruption, and a magnitude larger eruption)
and associated probabilities of these occurring.
Probabilities were re-assessed every week
immediately after eruption, which was subse-
quently extended to every month, then every
three months as time passed. Hazard extent was
considered for ballistics and PDC’s for each
scenario, exposure time along the impacted area,
and the vulnerability (probability of fatality) of
an individual to each hazard (using the area of
hazard around an individual impact for ballistics,
and the presence of a person in the path of a
PDC), to calculate the combined risk of fatality
for all scenarios (Jolly et al. 2014b).
Initial assessments suggested that ballistics
were the main hazard to life from the eruption,
though detailed mapping was not able to be
carried out until months later when risk levels
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had decreased (Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Jolly et al.
2014b). The Department of Conservation (DOC),
the agency responsible for hazard and risk man-
agement at Tongariro, began to implement risk
management as part of a recovery programme.
The risk assessments by Jolly et al. (2014b)
became an important tool for making decisions
about reopening. A new, event-speciﬁc Te Maari
hazard map was created using mapped deposits
and the most likely hazard scenarios, in which
the main hazard zone was increased to a 3 km
radius (choosing the larger potential radius based
on historic events) down-slope and deliberately
renamed the Active Volcanic Hazard Zone
(AVHZ) to distinguish it from the former map
(Fig. 3b). It included ballistics, explosions,
pyroclastic density currents, lahars, gas and
rockfall (Jolly et al. 2014b). The accompanying
text to the crisis hazard map was also updated,
with a ballistic speciﬁc instruction to ‘seek
immediate shelter from flying rocks if an explo-
sion occurs’ (GNS Science 2012). The map was
released to the public alongside a Volcanic Alert
Bulletin describing the changes made to the map
and the source of the data (Volcanic Alert Bul-
letin TON-2012/23). This was distributed to the
media (print, television, web and radio) to inform
a wider audience (Leonard et al. 2014). Addi-
tionally, the map was posted at either ends of the
track and where it crossed the boundaries of the
AVHZ. Cordons, initially manned, were estab-
lished at either ends of the TAC to prevent hikers
from entering. Later, the cordon was moved to
Emerald Lakes (on the edge of the 3 km Vol-
canic Hazard Zone) as the track was partially
reopened. With declining risk of further eruption
(based on the trend of the eruption probability
estimates made by GNS to estimate how the
expert elicitation might evolve over time), the
track was fully opened 5 ½ months after the 21
November eruption.
DOC also published educational information
on the eruption hazard at Te Maari including
further advice on actions to take in an eruption
(Fig. 5c). This included to ‘stop, look for flying
rocks’, to ‘ﬁnd shelter behind something—banks,
ridges or in hollows’, to not turn away from
‘flying rocks unless you are sure they will not hit
you’ and to ‘get out of the Hazard Zone along
one of the indicated escape routes’ (Department
of Conservation 2012). In October 2013 elec-
tronic warning signs were installed that informed
hikers of the status of the volcano—a red flashing
light meant danger-turn back, orange elevated
risk and green normal volcanic activity (Jolly
et al. 2014b, Fig. 5a). A survey of 203 hikers on
the TAC in March–May 2014 indicated that most
people saw these signs when activated red and
understood the messages irrespective of their
native language (Keys 2015). A reinforced public
shelter and warden’s quarters was one option
being considered to replace the damaged Kete-
tahi Hut. Now the favoured option is to replace it
with facilities outside the AVHZ.
5.2 Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu
Yasur Volcano is a frequently erupting basaltic
scoria cone located on Tanna Island, Vanuatu
(Cronin and Sharp 2002). Strombolian and Vul-
canian eruptions have been relatively continuous
since 1774 (Eissen et al. 1991). Ballistics are the
main hazard produced by these eruptions,
responsible for multiple fatalities in the past
(Baxter and Gresham 1997). Yasur is one of
Vanuatu’s main tourist attractions with some
twenty thousand people visiting the crater rim
b Fig. 5 Risk communication methods used at Tongariro,
New Zealand. a Electronic signs communicating risk
level and track closure at entrances to the volcano and
where it crosses the AVHZ. b Signs advising area of
increased hazard including a track-speciﬁc AVHZ hazard
map. c Additional information on volcanic hazards at
Tongariro (including ballistics), initially handed out to all
hikers, provided on Department of Conservation website.
d GeoNet website showing monitoring data such as
Volcanic Alert Level, seismic drums and visuals of the
volcano. e A Volcanic Alert Bulletin issued on
the GeoNet website and distributed to media following
the 2012 Upper Te Maari eruption
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each year. The vast majority of people are guided
up the volcano by local guides to watch the
eruptions occur, with a main viewing area only
150 m from the crater’s inner rim. As the
majority of people in the area are transient
tourists, guides are often relied upon to relay
hazard and risk information to their patrons.
Volcanic alert levels (VALs) and bulletins are
posted on the Vanuatu Meteorology and
Geo-Hazards Department (VMGD) website
when the behaviour of the volcano changes.
These sometimes include hazards maps that
provide the locations of where bombs have been
observed or are likely to impact, and often cau-
tion the public to approach the crater or haz-
ardous areas with care. Maps also urge visitors,
tourist agencies and communities to seriously
consider the information provided prior to
ascending Yasur (Vanuatu Geohazards Obser-
vatory 2009). However, advice or instructions
are not given for what to do if caught in an area
where ballistics are landing. A hazard map is
displayed at the carpark before the ascent up the
cone, highlighting the 1999 lava bomb impact
zone and the observation location for each vol-
canic alert level—as the alert level increases so
does the distance of the observation position
from the cone (i.e. restriction zones are
emplaced). In addition, visitors to Yasur are
warned by a sign to ‘Think Safety’ before
ascending the crater rim, though no further
instructions or information is provided. As it is
frequently erupting, it is assumed that visitors
accept the risk that they are entering into an
active volcanic hazard zone.
An updated risk management framework has
been developed from 2012 to 2016 including
updated bulletins and VALs, background and
safety (crisis) hazard maps, and tourist informa-
tion including education and safety map infor-
mation. This is associated with an upgrade of
Vanuatu’s active volcanoes to real-time warning
(at the time of writing this included a seis-
mometer and webcam on Yasur and daily OMI
satellite monitoring of SO2 emissions; Vanuatu
Geohazards Observatory 2014), supported by the
New Zealand Aid Programme and GNS Science
in partnership with VMGD. This integrated
framework allows for pre-planning of safety
zones related to ballistics and other hazards, and
integration with warning products such as bul-
letins, VALs and tourist information. Ballistic
zone ranges will initially be based on historic
event ranges, but will be updated to include the
modelling being developed in New Zealand,
once available.
5.3 Sakurajima Volcano, Japan
Another frequently active volcano in which bal-
listics are a major hazard is Sakurajima Volcano,
Japan. Continuous Vulcanian eruptions have
occurred since 2009 from the andesitic composite
cone (Japan Meteorological Agency 2013b).
Sakurajima is constantly monitored by the
Sakurajima Volcano Observatory and is consid-
ered to be one of the best monitored volcanoes in
Japan (GSJ 2013). When activity changes, alert
levels are posted on the Japan Meteorological
Agency (JMA) website for the public to view.
Many people live in close proximity to the vol-
cano (*4900 within 5 km of the volcano) and
millions visit the Kagoshima-Sakurajima area
each year (3,702,000 in 2010; Japan Meteoro-
logical Agency 2013b), thus JMA and Kagosh-
ima City released a volcanic hazard map with
additional information in 2010. This map was
distributed to local citizens and posted around the
volcano. Three relevant zones are delineated on
the map: the ﬁrst is a 2 km radius (from the active
craters) restricted area in which both residents and
tourists are restricted from entering at all times;
the second is*3 km away from the active vents
showing the area expected to be inundated with
volcanic bombs in a ‘strong eruption’, and lastly a
6 km radius extends around the active vents
where ‘volcanic rock’ is likely to impact from a
‘great eruption’ (Kagoshima City 2010). Deﬁni-
tions for ‘strong eruption’ and ‘great eruption’ are
not provided, nor is an explanation of the data that
these zones are based on. The hazard map also
includes societal components such as important
landmarks i.e. schools and the visitor centre, and
evacuation buildings and ports. The other half of
the map consists of information on precursory
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phenomena likely to be felt and who to call if
detected; how volcanic warnings will be dis-
seminated and the measures needed to be taken;
what the ﬁve volcanic alert levels are/what
activity is expected and the consequent actions
needed to be taken; information on major historic
eruptions and recent activity; and evacuation
procedures. An English version of the map is
available in addition to the original in Japanese.
This information is also available on the ofﬁcial
tourism website of Kagoshima City (http://www.
city.kagoshima.lg.jp/soumu/shichoshitu/kokusai/
en/emergency/sakurajima.html). Ballistics (called
‘cinders’) are additionally listed on the site as a
possible volcanic hazard accompanied by a
description, particle size and travel distance. To
prepare for a future eruption from Sakurajima,
Tarumizu City (Kagoshima Prefecture) runs an
emergency response exercise every year (http://
www.city.tarumizu.lg.jp/kikikanri/kurashi/bosai/
bosai/taisaku/sakurajima.html).
Three other notable risk communication and
mitigation measures have been implemented at
Sakurajima. A Volcano Disaster Prevention
Council was created as a means of communication
to discuss disaster prevention measures between
volcanologists, local government, JMA, and other
invested agencies (http://www.data.jma.go.jp/svd/
vois/data/fukuoka/506_Sakurajima/506_bousai.
html). Secondly, signs instructing people on the
distance and direction to the nearest eruption safe
house and evacuation port have been posted around
the volcano. Lastly, concrete roofed shelters have
been built around the island to protect visitors from
falling ballistics (Erfurt-Cooper 2010).
5.4 2014 Eruption of Mt. Ontake,
Japan
Mt. Ontake is a stratovolcano located on the island
of Honshu, Japan (Japan Meteorological Agency
2013a). It is not a continuously active volcano with
four eruptions (all phreatic) in its historic record
(1979, 1991, 2007 and 2014; JapanMeteorological
Agency 2013a; Smithsonian Institution 2013).
Mt. Ontake straddles the boundary of two prefec-
tures—Gifu and Nagano, with trails on either side.
Both prefectures have developed hazard maps for
two eruption scenarios that include ballistics—the
ﬁrst a phreatic eruption similar in size to the 1979
eruption (VEI 2) and the second a larger eruption on
the scale of 90,000–20,000 year recurrence interval
(Nagano hazard map: http://vivaweb2.bosai.go.jp/
v-hazard/L_read/53ontakesan/53ontake_2h03-L.
pdf; Gifu hazard map: http://vivaweb2.bosai.go.jp/
v-hazard/L_read/53ontakesan/53ontake_2h01-L.
pdf). In both maps, ballistic hazard is deﬁned by a
4 km asymmetric zone around an asymmetric vent
area encompassing the 1979 vents—the same vents
that erupted in the 1991 and 2007 eruptions. The
parameter by which the zone is based on is not
provided (e.g. maximum travel distance, spatial
density of impacts) and no advice accompanies the
hazard map, though a residents’ handbook was
printed that included examples ofwhat ballistics are
and how far they can travel. The maps and hand-
books are available on the NIED database and the
prefectural governmentwebsites, though themap is
not signposted around the volcano.
Mt. Ontake is constantly monitored by the
JMA, with seismometers, GPS stations, tilt-
meters, cameras and infrasonic microphones
(Japan Meteorological Agency 2013a). In addi-
tion, preparedness communication measures also
include Volcanic Alert Levels, in place since
2008 (Japan Meteorological Agency 2013a).
Similarly to other volcanoes, these VALs range
from 1 to 5 and include whether the alert level is
a warning or forecast, the target area (e.g. crater
area or more distal residential areas), the expec-
ted volcanic activity and phenomena with
examples of previous cases, actions needed to be
taken and also keywords accompanying the level
(e.g. level 5 with ‘evacuate’).
The 27 September 2014 phreatic eruption
occurred at lunchtime on a busy autumn day
when *340 hikers were on the mountain
(Tsunematsu et al. 2016). Multiple pyroclastic
surges were produced, travelling up to 2.5 km
from vent, in addition to ballistics that impacted
up to 1 km from the vent (Kaneko et al. 2016;
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Tsunematsu et al. 2016). Fifty-eight people were
killed in the eruption, 55 most likely the result of
ballistic trauma relatively close to the summit,
with ﬁve still missing (as of 24 June 2016;
Tsunematsu et al. 2016). An increase in summit
seismicity was noted 16 days prior to the erup-
tion resulting in the JMA releasing notices about
volcanic activity, though activity was not at
levels signiﬁcant enough to raise the Volcanic
Alert Level (there needed to be signs of defor-
mation, which were not recorded until just prior
to eruption; The Japan News, 26/10/14; Ui
2015). The eruption was largely unexpected with
11 min of precursory tremor, and uplift detected
only seven minutes before the event (Ui 2015).
This was a much shorter period of precursory
activity than previous eruptions. The 1979
eruption was preceded by earthquake swarms for
a year and ﬁve months. A month of seismicity
was noted prior to the 1991 eruption, increasing
in frequency just days before the event. And the
2007 eruption was preceded by inflation and
seismicity for three months, accompanied by
increasing fumarolic activity the week prior
(Japan Meteorological Agency 2013a). Longer
periods of precursory activity allow time for
warnings to be issued. JMA released warnings
prior to the 1991 and 2007 events, although the
resulting eruptions were very small, only
impacted the immediate area and occurred in
winter outside the climbing season (Japan
Meteorological Agency 2013a). However, if it
had been possible to issue a warning when the
precursory activity increased on the day of the
2014 eruption, it is unlikely that it would have
resulted in no fatalities. Any evacuation warning
prior to an event would need to occur at least an
hour before the event and be immediately trans-
mitted to all hikers on the summit area as it takes
over an hour for hikers to move out of the bal-
listic hazard zone. Nonetheless, even a short
warning time may have provided more hikers
time to get to shelter.
Following the eruption, the Volcanic Alert
Level was increased to 3, warning people not to
approach the volcano (as access was restricted),
and that blocks may be ejected up to 1 km from
vent (based on previous eruptions). Signs were
posted around the volcano telling people to “keep
out” of the restricted area. Search and Rescue
teams were deployed to rescue the injured hikers
and those that sheltered in the buildings at the
summit, and to recover the dead. Those that
sheltered in the buildings around the summit
survived the 2014 eruption, while many of the
fatalities occurred due to hikers choosing to take
photos and video of the eruption outside instead
of running to the nearest hut. Half of the people
autopsied by one doctor were found with cell-
phones in hand while one person’s camera was
found with a photo taken 4 min after the eruption
occurred (Mainichi Shimbun 10/10/2014). Some
then attempted to shelter around the summit
shrine which they could not gain access to (the
summit shrine is only open from the beginning of
July to early September). Fatalities also occurred
in exposed areas where there were no buildings
in sight to shelter within. Personal safety mea-
sures taken by exposed hikers saved lives. This
included sheltering behind large rocks, placing
backpacks on heads, and wearing hard hats
provided inside the mountain huts (NHK 2015).
Numerous risk management and communica-
tion tools have since been adopted. Prior to the
eruption, Gifu and Nagano prefectures had sepa-
rate commissions to manage volcanic activity
from Mt. Ontake. Following the 2014 eruption
they have combined to form one commission for
the entire volcano, improving communication
between the prefectures and subsequently to the
public. The commission, similar to the Sakurajima
council, is comprised of volcanologists, local
government, JMA and other interested agencies
(http://www.pref.nagano.lg.jp/kisochi/kisochi-sei
saku/ontakesan/kazanbousaikyougikai.html). The
council ran its ﬁrst eruption evacuation drill on 4th
June 2015.
Interviews conducted post-eruption showed
that many climbers were unaware of the volcanic
activity notices released, while of those that were
aware 76% did not consider that they needed to
be prepared for an eruption (The Japan News
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26/10/2014; Shinano Mainichi Shimbun 2015).
JMA subsequently launched a website to provide
climbers with its observations of the volcanic
activity around Japan, in an attempt to improve
communication to climbers. From the 1st April,
2015 the Gifu Prefectural Government made it
mandatory for all climbers of Ontake to submit a
mountain climbing notiﬁcation form prior to
ascending Mt. Ontake, in an effort to improve
knowledge of the number and location of people
on the mountain, and to improve communication
in times of crisis by recording their emergency
contact information (http://www.pref.gifu.lg.jp/
English/tourism/mountain/). Kiso, a town in the
Nagano Prefecture responsible for one of the
mountain trails, has also installed loudspeakers in
the mountain cabins prior to easing restrictions in
September 2015 (The Japan Times 27/09/2015).
In November 2015, a new hazard map was
released by the Ontakesan Volcano Disaster
Prevention Council (the combined commission
mentioned previously). It provides two ballistic
hazard zones—one for a phreatic eruption that
extends 2 km from the vent area, and one for a
larger magmatic eruption, extending 4 km from
the vent area (http://www.city.gero.lg.jp/
hazardmap/#12/35.9073/137.5203). The zones
are based on research completed for Mt. Fuji on
past ballistic distributions from phreatic and
magmatic eruptions in Japan and around the
world (Mount Fuji Disaster Prevention Council
2004). The asymmetric vent area has also been
increased signiﬁcantly, encompassing 3 km in
length and *2 km in width. In addition, further
research has been completed on the ballistic
hazard produced in the eruption. Tsunematsu
et al. (2016) describe an elongated distribution
toward the N-NE resulting from an inclined
ejection and topographic controls such as the
shape of the valley the vents formed in. The
spatial distribution was mapped from aerial
photos by Kaneko et al. (2016) and delineated
into four zones. The densest zone (A) encom-
passes areas with impact densities >10 impacts
per 5  5 m, decreasing in density with distance
from the vent to Zone C which has between 0
and 2 impacts per 5  5 m.
6 Discussion
6.1 Understand the Context
and Assess the Risk
We identify from review of literature and anal-
ysis of the four case study volcanoes (Table 2)
that understanding the risk context is highly
important for effective communication associated
with ballistic hazard and risk. Establishing this
context and identifying potential risks requires
engagement with potential stakeholders, such as
those which may be exposed or affected by bal-
listic, or other, volcanic hazards. Effective com-
munication is an essential component of this.
Once these steps are complete, we then suggest
that a ballistic risk assessment is undertaken to
help underpin effective management and com-
munication of ballistic hazard and risk.
Best-practice ballistic risk assessment generally
consists of: (1) reviewing the volcano’s eruptive
history to establish eruption frequency and
eruption magnitude; (2) determining the nature
and extent of past ballistic distributions; (3) ex-
ploring possible future ballistic distributions;
(4) identifying assets exposed in the area; and
(5) estimating the asset’s vulnerability. Once
complete, risk can be evaluated and appropriate
management and communication strategies
implemented. However, we stress that risk
assessment alone cannot underpin effective
communication of ballistic hazard and risk. But
must be carried out in conjunction with the tools
and strategies listed in Table 1 and Fig. 2.
It is important to remember that every context
is different and what works at one volcano does
not necessarily mean it will work or is needed at
another. An assessment for a frequently erupting,
highly visited volcano where risk management
organisations are well resourced will require a
different approach compared with an infrequently
active, rarely visited volcano in a country where
there are few resources available for risk man-
agement. The scope and scale of risk manage-
ment activities should be guided by the risk
context, and determine which and how risk
management tools and strategies are used.
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6.2 Reflections on the Four Case
Study Volcanoes
All of the volcanoes studied are capable of sus-
taining injuries and fatalities from ballistics. The
Mt. Ontake 2014 eruption resulted in the most
fatalities from any of the case studies, and pro-
vides a chance to analyse why this was so with the
aim of preventing it from occurring again. Mul-
tiple factors contributed to the high fatality rate:
• The eruption happened in peak season when
*340 people were on the mountain.
• Precursory activity only increased 11 min
prior to eruption, resulting in an unexpected
eruption. This meant no warning was able to
be issued to the people on the summit and no
closure of the summit prior to the event
occurred. Previous eruptions had precursory
events that gave more warning of the
impending eruption underscoring that past
history should not be solely relied on to pre-
dict outcomes of future unrest.
• The Alert Level was not raised following
increased seismicity beginning 16 days
before the eruption. A requirement for this to
occur is the presence of ground deformation,
which was not recorded until 7 min before
the eruption.
• Hikers chose to take images and video of the
eruption instead of ﬁnding shelter. This
decision may have been different had hazard
maps been posted around the volcano with
instructions on actions to take in an eruption.
Fatalities from ballistics could occur at all of
the case study volcanoes. However, a scenario
with fatalities on the scale seen at Ontake is unli-
kely from Sakurajima due to the 2 km restriction
zone. Yasur is visited by much fewer tourists than
Ontake so it is unlikely to see as many fatalities
from one event as occurred at Ontake, although
the lack of shelter, lack of hazard advice, and
proximity to the vent means that ballistic casu-
alties are still relatively likely at this volcano.
Work is ongoing to reduce this risk. The August
2012 eruption of Upper Te Maari is the most
comparable to the Ontake eruption as it was
largely unheralded and of the same explosivity. If
the August 2012 eruption had occurred in peak
tourist season, then a similar amount of fatalities as
Ontake potentially could have occurred.
6.3 Critical Issues
We identify the following critical issues for
contemporary and future communication of vol-
canic ballistic risk, based on our review of liter-
ature and analysis of the four case study
volcanoes. We note many of these issues tran-
scend volcanic ballistics to include nearly all
volcano types and volcanic hazards:
• What is the most effective way to manage and
communicate risk from volcanoes which are
(highly) visited and/or settled which experi-
ence eruptions with very short and/or no
meaningful warnings (e.g. Ontake, Te
Maari)? This is a critical issue for managing
ballistic risk, as eruptions with longer unrest
phases typically allow evacuation of ballistic
hazard zones before the eruption.
• What are the most appropriate risk manage-
ment and communication strategies for vol-
canoes where ballistic (and other) risk is
present which have poorly understood erup-
tive histories and/or monitoring systems?
• Effective ballistic risk assessment requires
greater understanding of (a) the distribution of
ballistic from a range of potential eruption
styles, (b) the impact of ballistics to people and
other societal assets (vulnerability/fragility
characteristics), and (c) identiﬁcation and
(crucially) evaluation of what are the most
appropriate mitigation actions to reduce bal-
listic risks before, during and after an eruption.
• Successfulmanagement of ballistic risk requires
effective engagement (of which communication
is a keystone) between authorities responsible
formanaging riskatvolcanoes, thosepeopleand
organisationswhomay have economic, cultural
and social connections with a volcano, and the
scientiﬁc community who can help inform
hazard and (sometimes) risk considerations.
Organisational and governance frameworks to
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allow and facilitate this seem to be highly vari-
able globally, but some relatively successful
examples do exist (e.g. New Zealand).
• How to manage future risk, particularly for
volcanoeswhere there is signiﬁcant existing use
and/or strong pressure to utilise the resources
through tourism (increasing visitor numbers to
high risk areas), and agricultural and settlement
pressure from population growth.
7 Conclusions
Ballistic projectiles ejected in explosive erup-
tions present a major proximal hazard to life,
infrastructure and the environment. An increas-
ing population living on or close to active vol-
canoes and a growing volcano tourism industry
give rise to an increased number of people
exposed to ballistic hazard, presenting a consid-
erable need for detailed ballistic hazard and risk
assessments, and specialised communication and
management strategies. Recommended strategies
would include at least the following:
(1) Hazard and risk assessments (ideally proba-
bilistic) speciﬁc to the volcano in question,
which include ballistics where appropriate,
that are made available to emergency man-
agers and decision makers with authors/
scientists available to answer questions and
advise where necessary and practical;
(2) The inclusion of ballistic hazard zones in
hazard maps with accompanying advice on
what to do. Maps should be updated in a crisis
to reflect new information and readily avail-
able through a range of media. These maps
should continue to be updated after the event
when detailed scientiﬁc studies are complete;
(3) Volcano monitoring systems to monitor
volcanic activity and indicate when a vol-
cano is in unrest;
(4) The use of signage around the volcano to
communicate ballistic hazard and risk, inte-
grated with other hazard advice, including
warning systems where practical, and with a
focus on effectiveness of communication
rather than just providing information;
(5) The use of volcanic alert bulletins, media
releases or reports to communicate ballistic
hazard and risk in crisis phases;
(6) Open, sufﬁciently frequent communication
between scientists, stakeholders, emergency
managers and local communities in which
updates and training are provided, and
informed input made into management and
mitigation measures.
These strategies may vary with eruptive state
(quiescence or crisis), frequency of eruptions,
availability of resources, andwhether ballistics are
the main hazard at the particular volcano. In
addition to the strategies mentioned in this chap-
ter, further work is needed to test and update the
advice provided to visitors on the actions to take in
a ballistic eruption, in particular personal protec-
tive measures. Effort should also be made to pro-
vide consistent advice at all volcanoes on the
actions to be taken, depending on the volcanic
hazards involved. This way the information would
be reinforced with visits to different volcanoes and
increase the likelihood of visitors acting correctly.
Acknowledgements Funding for this study was provided
byDeVoRA (Determining Volcanic Risk in Auckland) and
a New Zealand Earthquake Commission (EQC) Biennial
Grant (16/727). RHF is also supported by a doctoral
scholarship from the Ngāi Tahu Research Centre. We wish
to thank Bill McGuire and an anonymous reviewer for their
thorough and constructive reviews.
References
Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia MA, Delgado-Granados H, Ding-
well DB (2012) Hazard map for volcanic ballistic
impacts at Popocatépetl volcano (Mexico). Bull Volc
74(9):2155–2169
Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia MA, Morales-Iglesias H,
Ramos-Hernández SG, Jon-Selvas J, Jiménez-Aguilar
JM (2016) Hazard zoning for volcanic ballistic
impacts at El Chichón Volcano (Mexico). Nat
Hazards. doi:10.1007/s11069-016-2152-0
Artunduaga A, Jimenez G (1997) Third version of the
hazard map of Galeras Volcano, Colombia. J Volcanol
Geoth Res 77:89–100
Barclay J, Haynes K, Mitchell T, Solana C, Teeuw R,
Darnell A, Crosweller HS, Cole P, Pyle D, Lowe C,
Fearnley C, Kelman I (2008) Framing volcanic risk
communication within disaster risk reduction: ﬁnding
The Communication and Risk Management of Volcanic Ballistic Hazards 23
ways for the social and physical sciences to work
together. Geol Soc, London, Spec Publ 305(1):163–177
Baxter P, Gresham A (1997) Deaths and injuries in the
eruption of Galeras Volcano, Colombia, 14 January
1993. J Volcanol Geoth Res 77:325–338
Becker JS, Saunders WSA, Robertson CM, Leonard GS,
Johnston DM (2010) A synthesis of challenges and
opportunities for reducing volcanic risk through land
use planning in New Zealand. Australas J Disaster
Trauma Stud 2010:1
Bertolaso G, De Bernardinis B, Bosi V, Cardaci C,
Ciolli S, Colozza R, Cristiani C, Mangione D, Ric-
ciardi A, Rosi M, Scalzo A, Soddu P (2009) Civil
protection preparedness and response to the 2007
eruptive crisis of Stromboli volcano, Italy. J Volcanol
Geoth Res 182(3–4):269–277
Bird DK, Gisladottir G, Dominey-Howes D (2010) Vol-
canic risk and tourism in southern Iceland: implications
for hazard, risk and emergency response education and
training. J Volcanol Geoth Res 189:33–48
Blong RJ (1981) Some effects of tephra falls on buildings.
In: Self S, Sparks RSJ (ed) Tephra studies, proceed-
ings NATO Advanced Studies Institute, Laugarvatn
and Reykjavik, 18–29 June 1980, pp 405–420
Blong RJ (1984) Volcanic hazards: a sourcebook on the
effects of eruptions. Academic Press, Orlando
Blong RJ (1996) Volcanic hazards risk assessment. In:
Scarpa R, Tilling RI (eds) Monitoring and mitigation
of volcanic hazards. Springer, Berlin, pp 675–698
Booth B (1979) Assessing volcanic risk. J Geol Soc
136(3):331–340
Bower S, Woods A (1996) On the dispersal of clasts from
volcanic craters during small explosive eruptions.
J Volcanol Geoth Res 73:19–32
Breard ECP, Lube G, Cronin SJ, Fitzgerald R,
Kennedy B, Scheu B, Montanaro C, White JDL,
Tost M, Procter JN, Moebis A (2014) Using the
spatial distribution and lithology of ballistic blocks to
interpret eruption sequence and dynamics: August 6
2012 Upper Te Maari eruption, New Zealand. J Vol-
canol Geoth Res 286:373–386
Burby RJ, Wagner F (1996) Protecting tourists from death
and injury in coastal storms. Disasters 20(1):49–60
Calvari S, Spampinato L, Lodato L (2006) The 5 April
2003 vulcanian paroxysmal explosion at Stromboli
volcano (Italy) from ﬁeld observations and thermal
data. J Volcanol Geoth Res 149(1–2):160–175
Christiansen RL (1980) Eruption of Mount St. Helens—
volcanology. Nature 285:531–533
Cole JW, Cowan HA, Webb TA (2006) The 2006 Raoul
Island Eruption—a review of GNS science’s actions.
GNS Science Report 2006/7 38 p
Coombs ML, McGimsey RG, Browne BL (2008)
Preliminary volcano-hazard assessment for Gareloi
Volcano, Gareloi Island. Alaska Scientiﬁc Investiga-
tions Report 2008-5159
Cronin SJ, Sharp DS (2002) Environmental impacts on
health from continuous volcanic activity at Yasur
(Tanna) and Ambrym, Vanuatu. Int J Environ Health
Res 12(2):109–123
Cronin SJ, Gaylord DR, Charley D, Alloway BV,
Wallez S, Esau JW (2004) Participatory methods of
incorporating scientiﬁc with traditional knowledge for
volcanic hazard management on Ambae Island, Van-
uatu. Bull Volcanol 66(7):652–668
Department of Conservation (2012) Volcanic risk in Ton-
gariro National Park. http://www.doc.govt.nz/parks-
and-recreation/places-to-go/central-north-island/places/
tongariro-national-park/know-before-you-go/volcanic-
risk-in-tongariro-national-park/. Accessed Mar 2015
Dohaney J, Brogt E, Kennedy B, Wilson TM, Lindsay JM
(2015) Training in crisis communication and volcanic
eruption forecasting: design and evaluation of an
authentic role-play simulation. J Appl Volcanol 4:12
Drabek TE (1995) Disaster responses within the tourist
industry. Int J Mass Emerg Disasters 13(1):7–23
Eissen JP, Blot C, Louat R (1991) Chronologie de
l’activité volcanique historique de l’arc insulaire des
Nouvelles-Hébrides de 1595 à 1991. Rapp. Scientiﬁques
Technique, Sci. Terre Geol.-Geophys. – ORSTOM
(Noumea) 2
Erfurt-Cooper P (2010) Volcano and geothermal tourism
in Kyushu, Japan. Volcano and geothermal tourism:
sustainable geo-resources for leisure and recreation,
Earthscan, p. 142
Erfurt-Cooper P (2011) Geotourism in volcanic and
geothermal environments: playing with ﬁre? Geoher-
itage 3:187–193
Ewart JW, Harpel CJ (2004) In harm’s way: Population
and volcanic risk. Geotimes, American Geological
Institute. http://www.geotimes.org/apr04/feature_VPI.
html. Accessed 15 June 2016
Fagents S, Wilson L (1993) Explosive volcanic
eruptions—VII. The ranges of pyroclasts ejected in
transient volcanic explosions. Geophys J Int 113:359–
370
Fitzgerald RH, Tsunematsu K, Kennedy BM,
Breard ECP, Lube G, Wilson TM, Jolly AD, Pawson J,
Rosenberg MD, Cronin SJ (2014) The application of a
calibrated 3D ballistic trajectory model to ballistic
hazard assessments at Upper Te Maari, Tongariro.
J Volcanol Geoth Res 286:248–262
Fudali R, Melson W (1972) Ejecta velocities, magma
chamber pressure and kinetic energy associated with
the 1968 eruption of Arenal volcano. Bull Volc
35:383–401
Geological Survey of Japan (2013) Sakurajima Volcano,
2nd edn. https://gbank.gsj.jp/volcano/Act_Vol/sakuraj
ima/text/eng/exp01-5e.html. Accessed Feb 2015
GNS Science (2007) Volcanic hazards at Tongariro.
http://info.geonet.org.nz/download/attachments/8585
571/Tongariro_Poster_A4.pdf. Accessed Mar 2015




Gregg CE, Houghton BF, Paton D, Swanson DA, John-
ston DM (2004) Community preparedness for lava
flows from Mauna Loa and Hualālai volcanoes, Kona,
Hawai’i. Bull Volc 66:531–540
24 R.H. Fitzgerald et al.
Gurioli L, Harris AJL, Colo L, Bernard J, Favalli M,
Ripepe M, Andronico D (2013) Classiﬁcation, landing
distribution, and associated flight parameters for a
bomb ﬁeld emplaced during a single major explosion
at Stromboli, Italy. Geology 41(5):559–562
Hadisantono RD, Andreastuti MCHSD, Abdurach-
man EK, Sayudi DS, Nursusanto I, Martono A,
Sumpena AD, Muzani M (2002) Peta Kawasan
Rawan Bencana Gung Api Merapi, Jawa Tengah
dan Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta scale 1:50 000
Direktorat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi Bencana Geo-
logi, Bandung
Harris AJL, Ripepe M, Hughes EA (2012) Detailed
analysis of particle launch velocities, size distributions
and gas densities during normal explosions at Strom-
boli. J Volcanol Geoth Res 231–232:109–131
Haynes K, Barclay J, Pidgeon N (2007) Volcanic hazard
communication using maps: an evaluation of their
effectiveness. Bull Volc 70(2):123–138
Haynes K, Barclay J, Pidgeon N (2008) The issue of trust
and its influence on risk communication during a
volcanic crisis. Bull Volc 70(5):605–621
Houghton BF, Swanson DA, Carey RJ, Rausch J,
Sutton AJ (2011) Pigeonholing pyroclasts: Insights
from the 19 March 2008 explosive eruption of Kilauea
volcano. Geology 39(3):263–266
Japan Meteorological Agency (2013a) 53 Ontakesan.




Japan Meteorological Agency (2013b) 90 Sakurajima.




Jenkins SF, Spence RJS, Fonseca JFBD, Solidum RU,
Wilson TM (2014) Volcanic risk assessment: quanti-
fying physical vulnerability in the built environment.
J Volcanol Geoth Res 276:105–120
Johnston DM, Bebbington MS, Lai CD, Houghton BF,
Paton D (1999) Volcanic hazard perceptions: com-
parative shifts in knowledge and risk. Disaster Prev
Manag 8:118–126
Johnston DM, Houghton BF, Neall VE, Ronan KR,
Paton D (2000) Impacts of the 1945 and 1995–1996
Ruapehu eruptions, New Zealand: an example of
increasing societal vulnerability. Geol Soc Am Bull
112:720–726
Jolly AD, Jousset P, Lyons JJ, Carniel R, Fournier N,
Fry B, Miller C (2014a) Seismo-acoustic evidence for
an avalanche driven phreatic eruption through a
beheaded hydrothermal system: An example from
the 2012 Tongariro eruption. J Volcanol Geoth Res
286:331–347
Jolly GE, Keys HJR, Procter JN, Deligne NI (2014b)
Overview of the co-ordinated risk-based approach to
science and management response and recovery for
the 2012 eruptions of Tongariro volcano, New
Zealand. J Volcanol Geoth Res 286:184–207
Kagoshima City (2010) Sakurajima Volcano hazard
map. http://www.city.kagoshima.lg.jp/soumu/shichos
hitu/kokusai/en/emergency/documents/sakurazimahm_
eng.pdf. Accessed 19 Oct 2015
Kaneko T, Maeno F, Nakada S (2016) 2014 Mount
Ontake eruption: characteristics of the phreatic erup-
tion as inferred from aerial observations. Earth,
Planets Space 68:72–82
Keys H (2015) Tongariro Alpine crossing visitors
surveyed on effectiveness of new electronic light
signs. Tongariro Aug 2015, pp 48–51. www.tongariro.
org.nz/tongarirojournals. Accessed 18 Oct 2015
Keys HJR, Green PM (2010) Mitigation of volcanic risks
at Mt Ruapehu, New Zealand. In: Malet J-P, Glade T,
Casagli N (eds) Proceedings of the mountain risks
international conference, Firenze, Italy, CERG, Stras-
bourg, France, 24–26 Nov 2010, pp. 485–490
Kilgour G, Della Pasqua F, Hodgson KA, Jolly GE (2010)
The 25 September 2007 eruption of Mount Ruapehu,
New Zealand: directed ballistics, surtseyan jets, and
ice-slurry lahars. J Volcanol Geoth Res 191(1–2):1–14
Leonard GS, Johnston DM, Paton D, Christianson A,
Becker J, Keys H (2008) Developing effective warning
systems: ongoing research at Ruapehu volcano, New
Zealand. J Volcanol Geoth Res 172(3–4):199–215
Leonard GS, Stewart C, Wilson TM, Procter JN, Scott BJ,
Keys HJ, Jolly GE, Wardman JB, Cronin SJ,
McBride SK (2014) Integrating multidisciplinary
science, modelling and impact data into evolving,
syn-event volcanic hazardmapping and communication:
a case study from the 2012 Tongariro eruption crisis,
New Zealand. J Volcanol Geoth Res 286:208–232
Lindell MK (2013) Risk perception and communication.
In: Bobrowsky PT (ed) Encyclopedia of natural
hazards. Springer, Netherlands, pp 870–874
Lube G, Breard ECP, Cronin SJ, Procter JN, Brenna M,
Moebis A, Pardo N, Stewart RB, Jolly A, Fournier N
(2014) Dynamics of surges generated by hydrothermal
blasts during the 6 August 2012 Te Maari eruption,
Mt. Tongariro, New Zealand. J Volcanol Geoth Res
286:348–366
Maeno F, Nakada S, Nagai M, Kozono T (2013) Ballistic
ejecta and eruption condition of the vulcanian explo-
sion of Shinmoedake volcano, Kyushu, Japan on 1
February, 2011. Earth, Planets Space 65(6):609–621
Mainichi Shimbun 10/10/2014. Ballistic blocks killed 20
people instantly. http://mainichi.jp/select/news/2014
1010k0000m040138000c.html. Accessed 29 June 2016
Mileti D, Nathe S, Gori P, Greene M, Lemersal E (2004)
Public hazards communication and education: the
state of the art. natural hazards informer, Issue 2.
Boulder, p. 13
Minakami T (1942) 5. On the distribution of volcanic
ejecta (Part I.): the distributions of volcanic bombs
ejected by the recent explosions of Asama. Bull
Earthq Res Inst 20:65–92
Mount Fuji Disaster Prevention Council (2004) Report of
Mount Fuji Hazard Map Examination Committee
(in Japanese). http://www.bousai.go.jp/kazan/fujisan-
kyougikai/report/. Accessed 28 Jun 2016
The Communication and Risk Management of Volcanic Ballistic Hazards 25
Murphy PE, Bayley R (1989) Tourism and disaster
planning. Geogr Rev 79(1):36–46
Nadim F (2013) Hazard. In: Bobrowsky PT (ed) Encyclo-
pedia of natural hazards. Springer, Netherlands,
pp 425–426
Nairn IA, Self S (1978) Explosive eruptions and
pyroclastic avalanches from Ngauruhoe in February
1975. J Volcanol Geoth Res 3:36–60
Neal CA, McGimsey RG, Miller TP, Riehle JR,
Waythomas CF (2001) Preliminary volcano-hazard
assessment for AniakchakVolcano, Alaska. United States
Geological Survey Open File Report 00-519, Plate 1
NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) (2015). Ontake:
eyewitnesses or eruption. http://www.nhk.or.jp/d-navi/
link/ontake2014-en/index.html. Accessed Jul 21 2015
NIED (1980) Field report of the disaster from Ontake 1979
eruption. Natural Disaster Research Report 16, 41 p
Odbert H, Hincks T, Aspinall W (2015) Combining
volcano monitoring timeseries analysis with Bayesian
Belief Networks to update hazard forecast estimates.
EGU General Assembly 2015, 12–17 Apr 2015,
Vienna, Austria
Oikawa T, Yoshimoto M, Nakada S, Maeno F, Komori J,
Shimano T, Takeshita Y, Ishizuka Y, Ishimine Y
(2016) Reconstruction of the 2014 eruption sequence
of Ontake Volcano from recorded images and inter-
views. Earth, Planets Space 68:79
Pardo N, Cronin SJ, Németh K, Brenna M, Schipper CI,
BreardE,White JDL, Procter J, Stewart B,Agustin-Flores
J, Moebis A, Zernack A, Kereszturi G, Lube G, Auer A,
Wallace C (2014) Perils in distinguishing phreatic from
phreatomagmatic ash; insights into the eruption mecha-
nisms of the 6 August 2012 Mt. Tongariro eruption, New
Zealand. J Volcanol Geoth Res 286:397–414
Paton D, Millar M, Johnston DM (2001) Community
resilience to volcanic hazard consequences. Nat
Hazards 24:157–169
Paton D, Smith L, Daly M, Johnston D (2008) Risk
perception and volcanic hazard mitigation: individual
and social perspectives. J Volcanol Geoth Res 172(3–
4):179–188
Pistolesi M, Rosi M, Pioli L, Renzulli A, Bertagnini A,
Andronico D (2008) The paroxysmal event and its
deposits. The Stromboli Volcano: an integrated study
of the 2002–2003 eruption. Geophysica, 317–330
Pomonis A, Spence R, Baxter P (1999) Risk assessment
of residential buildings for an eruption of Furnas
Volcano, Sao Miguel, the Azores. J Volcanol
Geotherm Res 92(1–2):107–131
Robertson R, Cole P, Sparks RSJ, Harford C, Leje-
une AM, McGuire WJ, Miller AD, Murphy MD,
Norton G, Stevens NF, Young SR (1998) The
explosive eruption of Soufriere Hills Volcano,
Montserrat, West Indies, 17 September, 1996. Geo-
phys Res Lett 25(18):3429–3432
Scott BJ, Potter SH (2014) Aspects of historical eruptive
activity and volcanic unrest at Mt. Tongariro, New
Zealand: 1846–2013. J Volcanol Geoth Res 286:263–276
Shinano Mainichi Shimbun (2015) Veriﬁcation of Mount
Ontake eruption—living with a volcano. What do we
learn from 9.27? The Shinano Mainichi Shimbun
Press, Nagano (in Japanese)
Siegrist M, Cvetkovich G (2000) Perception of hazards:
the role of social trust and knowledge. Risk Anal 20
(5):713–720
Sigurdsson H, Lopes-Gautier R (1999) Volcanoes and
tourism. In: Sigurdsson H, Houghton B, McNutt SR,
Rymer H, Stix J (eds) Encyclopedia of volcanoes.
Academic Press, Cambridge, pp 1283–1299
Slovic P (2000) Perception of risk. In: Slovic P (ed) The
perception of risk. Earthscan, London, pp 220–231
Small C, Naumann T (2001) The global distribution of
human population and recent volcanism. Environ
Hazards 3:93–109
Smithsonian Institution (2013) Ontakesan bulletin reports,
Global Volcanism Program. http://www.volcano.si.
edu/volcano.cfm?vn=283040. Accessed Dec 2014
Sorensen JH (2000) Hazard warning systems: review of
20 years of progress. Nat Hazards Rev 1(2):119–125
Sorensen JH (2013) Communicating emergency informa-
tion. In: Bobrowsky PT (ed) Encyclopedia of natural
hazards. Springer, Netherlands, pp 110–112
Sparks RSJ, Aspinall WP, Crosweller HS, Hincks TK
(2013) Risk and uncertainty assessment of volcanic
hazards. In: Sparks RJS, Hill L (eds) Risk and
uncertainty assessment for natural hazards. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Steinberg G, Lorenz V (1983) External ballistic of
volcanic explosions. Bull Volcanol 46(4):333–348
Swanson DA, Zolkos SP, Haravitch B (2012) Ballistic
blocks around Kīlauea Caldera: Their vent locations
and number of eruptions in the late 18th century.
J Volcanol Geoth Res 231–232:1–11
The Japan News 26/10/2014. Improved steps needed to
inform volcano climbers in Japan. http://the-japan-news.
com/news/article/0001671312. Accessed 28 Oct 2014
The Japan News 27/10/2014. Mt. Ontake risks reported in
1979. http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/000167
3442. Accessed 28 Oct 2014
The Japan Times 27/9/2015. Families of Ontake victims
mark ﬁrst anniversary of deadly eruption. http://www.
japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/27/national/familieson
takevictimsmarkﬁrstanniversarydeadlyeruption/#.VxR
fHDB942w. Accessed 18 Apr 2016
Thompson MA, Lindsay JM, Gaillard JC (2015) The
influence of probabilistic volcanic hazard map prop-
erties on hazard communication. J Appl Volcanol 4:6
Thouret J-C, Lavigne F, Kelfoun K, Bronto S (2000)
Toward a revised hazard assessment at Merapi volcano,
Central Java. J Volcanol Geoth Res 100(1–4):
479–502
Tsunematsu K, Ishimine Y, Kaneko T, Yoshimoto M,
Fujii T, Yamaoka K (2016) Estimation of ballistic
block landing energy during 2014 Mount Ontake
eruption. Earth, Planets Space 68:88
Turtle EP, Lopes RMC, Lorenz RD, Radebaugh J,
Howell RR (2016) Temporal behavior and tempera-
tures of Yasur volcano, Vanuatu from ﬁeld remote
sensing observations, May 2014. J Volcanol Geoth
Res. doi:10.1016/j.jvolgeores.2016.02.030
26 R.H. Fitzgerald et al.
Twigg J (2002) The human factor in early warnings: risk
perception and appropriate communications. In:
Zschau J, Kuppers AN (eds) Early warning systems for
natural disaster reduction. Springer, Berlin, pp 19–26
Ui T (2015) The difﬁculty of predicting volcanic eruptions
and releasing information. Geography 60(5):43–49 (In
Japanese)
UNISDR (2009) United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Risk Reduction: UNISDR Terminology on
Disaster Risk Reduction (2009). http://www.unisdr.
org/eng/terminology/terminology-2009-eng.html.
Accessed Jun 2015
Vanuatu Geohazards Observatory (2009) Volcanic Alert
Status. http://www.geohazards.gov.vu/index.php/hazards-
updated-events/volcano-alert-status. Accessed Mar 2015
Vanuatu Geohazards Observatory (2014) Vanuatu Mon-
itoring Network (2012–2014). http://www.geohazards.
gov.vu/index.php/geophysical-monitoring-network/
vanuatu-monitoring-network. Accessed Apr 2015
Wardman J, Sword-Daniels V, Stewart C, Wilson T
(2012) Impact assessment of the May 2010 eruption of
Pacaya volcano, Guatemala. GNS Science Report
2012/09, 90 p
Williams KL, Keys HJR (2013) Reducing volcanic risk
on the Tongariro Alpine Crossing. Report of a
workshop 24 September 2013. Department of Con-
servation Tongariro District, 36 p
Wilson L (1972) Explosive volcanic eruptions II. The
atmospheric trajectories of pyroclasts. Geophys J Roy
Astron Soc 30(1):381–392
Wilson TM, Stewart C, Wardman JB, Wilson G, John-
ston DM, Hill D, Hampton SJ, Villemure M,
McBride S, Leonard G, Daly M, Deligne N,
Roberts L (2014) Volcanic ashfall preparedness poster
series: a collaborative process for reducing the vulner-
ability of critical infrastructure. J Appl Volcanol 3:10
Yamagishi H, Feebrey C (1994) Ballistic ejecta from the
1988–1989 andesitic Vulcanian eruptions of Tokachi-
dake volcano, Japan: morphological features and
genesis. J Volcanol Geoth Res 59(4):269–278
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution
and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you
give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license
and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter
are included in the work’s Creative Commons license,
unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such
material is not included in the work’s Creative Commons
license and the respective action is not permitted by
statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission
from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce
the material.
The Communication and Risk Management of Volcanic Ballistic Hazards 27
